“Beauty is Truth and Truth Beauty”:
How Intuitive Insights Shape Legal Reasoning and the
Rule of Law
Stephen M. Maurer*
ABSTRACT
Scientists have long recognized two distinct forms of human thought.
“Type 1” reasoning is unconscious, intuitive, and specializes in finding
complex patterns. It is typically associated with the aesthetic emotion that
John Keats called “beauty.” “Type 2” reasoning is conscious, articulable,
and deductive. Scholars usually assume that legal reasoning is entirely
Type 2. However, critics from Holmes to Posner have protested that
unconscious and intuitive judgments are at least comparably important.
This Article takes the conjecture seriously by asking what science can add
to our understanding of how lawyers and judges interpret legal texts.
The analysis is overdue. Humanities scholars have long invoked
findings from cognitive psychology, brain imaging, and neural network
theory to argue that postmodern interpretations that ignore texts in favor
of politics and cultural explanations are hopelessly incomplete. Similar
arguments should be a fortiori stronger in law, where judges and scholars
routinely stress the detailed wording of texts.
The Article begins by reviewing previous attempts to apply literary
theory to legal texts. We argue that the main failing of this literature is that
it says little or nothing about how judges and advocates choose between
competing legal interpretations. Section II argues that the best way to fill
this gap is to ask what scientists have learned about the brain. This includes
the fundamental insight that most human thought processes rely on both
Type 1 and Type 2 methods. The Article also documents the surprising
cognitive psychology result that Type 1 judgments show significant
universality, i.e. that humans who study subjects for long periods often
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make similar choices without regard to the societies they were born into.
Section III extends these arguments to law by arguing that legal judgment
frequently turns on the brain’s Type 1 pattern recognition machinery. The
next two Sections build on this foundation to construct an explicit theory
of how Type 1 thinking enters into legal reasoning and outcomes. Section
IV begins by reviewing nineteenth century theories that claimed a leading
role for intuitive reasoning in public policy. Section V updates these
theories to accommodate the relatively weak statistical correlations that
psychologists have documented, arguing that modern court systems
amplify these signals in approximately determinate ways. It also explains
why court systems that emphasize close textual analysis are able to resist
erosion from competing incentives like cronyism and judicial activism.
Section VI builds on these theory insights to suggest specific policy
prescriptions.
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INTRODUCTION
“Beauty is Truth, [and] Truth Beauty” – John Keats (1795–1821)1

Scholars have recognized since the eighteenth century that human
thought proceeds through two distinct processes—what psychologists call
“Type 1” (intuitive) and “Type 2” (logical).2 Type 1 usually dominates in
1. John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in THE POEMS OF JOHN KEATS 372–73 (Jack Stillinger
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1978) (1820).
2. For a recent book-length account, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND
SLOW (2011). Kahneman provides a useful table comparing the two modes. Id. at 105. The terms were
originally coined by Keith Stanovich and Richard West. Id. at 48.
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the arts, with Type 2 playing a supporting role at best. However, Type 1
also hosts the brain’s capacity for pattern recognition, making it a reliable
guide in fields where truth is defined by logic and experiment. Research
in physics and mathematics often consists of extending Type 1 intuitions
into Type 2 logical proofs.
The hallmark of Type 1 processes is the mysterious aesthetic emotion
that Keats called “beauty.” Modern brain scans confirm that the perception
of beauty in art and mathematics is located in nearly identical regions of
the brain. This makes it natural to ask how legal thought compares to art
and mathematics. While legal scholars typically assume the primacy of
logic, critics since Justice Holmes3 have protested that many cases are
actually decided by the unconscious and intuitive methods that Judge
Posner calls “practical reasoning.”4
This Article takes these insights seriously by analyzing legal
reasoning and the institutions based on it in explicitly Type 1 terms. This
marks a fundamental change from older approaches that try to construct
jurisprudence exclusively from Type 2 logic. The shortcomings of the
latter approach are particularly evident in the decades-long agenda to find
an intellectually coherent middle ground between formalists, who claim
that legal texts are completely determinate, and realists, who see judges as
entirely unconstrained. While most lawyers agree that such a middle
ground exists, we will see that existing philosophy-of-language accounts
based on narrowly Type 2 logic can only accommodate it at the cost of
introducing ugly, ad hoc assumptions. This Article argues that progress
will be better served by acknowledging the existence of Type 1 processes
and asking how they enter the law.
3. As Holmes famously declared, “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience . . . . The law . . . cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of
a book of mathematics.” O.W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Prof. Hawkins has
persuasively argued that the word “experience” denotes subconscious intuition and, conversely, that
Holmes saw formalist reasoning as “a vain attempt to systematize intuitively developed law.” Brian
Hawkins, The Life of the Law: What Holmes Meant, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 323, 323–76 (2012).
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP 287 (1988)
(“[B]etween the extremes of logical, or scientific, persuasion and emotive persuasion lie a variety of
methods for inducing justified true belief that are rational though not rigorous or exact. This is the
domain of practical reason.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 9 (2008) (arguing
that the existence of judicial discretion “is a consequence of legalism’s inability in many cases to
decide the outcome (or decide it tolerably . . . ), and the related difficulty, often impossibility, of
verifying the correctness of the outcome, whether by its consequences or its logic”). Posner also stated
that “legalist tools—including those most hallowed ones of reasoning by analogy and strictly
interpreting statutes and constitutions—come up short: The first is empty and the second has, despite
appearances, a large discretionary element.” Id. at 12. Additionally, he noted that “[l]egalists
acknowledge that their methods cannot close the deal every time . . . . There are too many vague
statutes and even vaguer constitutional provisions, statutory gaps and inconsistencies, professedly
discretionary domains, obsolete and conflicting precedents, and factual aporias.” Id. at 47.
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Similar changes are already underway in the humanities, where many
scholars now stress that the subjective sense of beauty causes
demonstrable changes in the brain. This immediately implies that realistic
theories of text interpretation must consider the reading, aesthetics, and
form of texts at least as much as the postmodern fixation on politics and
culture.5 This Article similarly seeks a biologically accurate understanding
of how lawyers write and interpret texts. That said, law poses special
problems. The reason is that a successful legal theory, unlike literature,
should point to a single best interpretation. This requires that experts reach
reliably similar judgments, at least on average, regardless of the culture
they were born into. This kind of universality is natural in the sciences:
given that there can be only one truth in the physical world, humans’
Type 1 intuitions must similarly converge or they would not be useful. We
argue that lawyers who spend their lives drafting documents to constrain
an uncertain future will develop similarly convergent intuitions in any
society where lawyering exists as a discernible activity. The surprise is
that the Type 1 emotion of beauty is similarly universal for entirely
subjective choices. For example, psychologists have shown that artists in
small Japanese villages reliably make the same aesthetic judgments as
American Ivy League experts. This implies that lawyers may have
similarly aesthetic preferences for some doctrinal choices compared to
others.
This Article starts from these basic psychological facts to construct
a positive theory of how Type 1 processes enter into legal reasoning, shape
the subjective experience of law, and explain why lawyers from widely
different backgrounds nevertheless tend to reach closely similar
judgments. We then build on these insights to make specific policy
recommendations and normative claims. In particular, the existence of
universality implies that all lawyers share at least some common Type 1
beliefs regardless of education and life experience. This gives new and
much more precise grounds for believing the traditional claim that legal
disputes can be decided in ways that are safely insulated from personal or
political bias.
We proceed as follows. Section I reviews historic attempts to locate
law within the more general problem of text interpretation. Section II
reviews what scientists have learned about Type 1 thought processes,
including mounting evidence that they provide a reliable guide to truth in
such fields as visual art, literature, physics, and mathematics. We also
describe evidence for a modest universality whereby experts from widely
different cultural and educational backgrounds often reach the same
5. See PAUL B. ARMSTRONG, HOW LITERATURE PLAYS WITH THE BRAIN: THE NEUROSCIENCE
(2013).
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aesthetic judgments. Section III presents evidence for Type 1 reasoning in
law and traces how it enters doctrine to decide cases. Section IV surveys
nineteenth century arguments that what we now call Type 1 reasoning
should be embraced as a reliable guide to law. It also updates these theories
to accommodate the more modest versions of universality that modern
science has documented. Finally, it asks how the prevalence of Type 1
thought frames lawyers’ everyday experience of practice. Section V asks
how legal institutions amplify universality’s weak ex ante consensus to
generate stable, predictable rules. Section VI extends these arguments to
make policy recommendations.
I. THE LAW-AND-LITERATURE DEBATE
Since the 1980s, legal scholars debating the determinacy of legal
texts have almost always grounded their arguments in literary theory. The
resulting law-and-literature movement can be traced to Professor
Levinson, who argued that humanities scholars could help lawyers
establish a coherent “set of rules” for estimating the “hardness” of meaning
against conflicting interpretations.6 This was both natural—legal
documents are plainly texts—and practical. The advantage, according to
Levinson, was that literary theory had long since moved beyond the law’s
arid debate between legal realists, who stress the “reality of disagreement
among equally competent speakers of the native language”7 and formalists
“infatuate[ed] . . . with the possibility of a science of criticism.”8 Despite
this, Levinson was not particularly hopeful, concluding with the gloomy
assessment that attempts to find meaningful patterns in precedent remain
“a supreme act of faith.”9
Two years later, Professor Dworkin seconded Levinson’s claim that
literary theory could help scholars escape law’s “flat distinction between
description and evaluation.”10 But he also warned that these theories could
make law less determinate, creating “hard cases” that judges would have
to decide “as a question of political theory,” although he hoped that judges
would choose these theories based on natural “fit” rather than personal
politics.11 At least in retrospect, Dworkin’s decision to invoke the aesthetic

6. See Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 373–406 (1982).
7. Id. at 379.
8. Id. at 380.
9. Id. at 402–03.
10. Ronald Dworkin, How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146–77 (1985).
11. See id. at 160–61 (“There is, of course, no algorithm for deciding whether a particular
interpretation sufficiently fits that history not to be ruled out . . . as a question of political theory.”).
Dworkin also stated that “any particular judge’s theory of fit will often fail to produce a unique
interpretation.” Id. at 161.

2018]

Beauty is Truth and Truth Beauty

135

concept of “fit” was an early hint that Type 1 reasoning could limit
discretion.
At this point, literary critic Stanley Fish entered the debate. His most
lasting contribution was to frame the problem in formally Type 2 terms as
“a few basic questions in the philosophy of language.”12 He then added
that an “interpretative community” could narrow the list of permissible
meanings.13 However, this superficially attractive claim is empirically
doubtful14 and, in any case, fails to supply the middle ground that Levinson
and Dworkin had sought. On the one hand, it implied that an unelected
elite would decide for everyone, a possibility that Levinson had rejected.15
On the other hand, no one could say exactly how much narrowing would
occur since this necessarily depended on who joined the community. This
gap was particularly painful since the existence of just one conflicting
interpretation could leave judges unconstrained.
Watching the argument play out, Judge Posner protested that the lawand-literature analogy had been misguided all along.16 Literature, he said,
was aesthetic and profited from ambiguity. But law was different, and
much more like everyday speech: “If a message is garbled . . . you try to
glean from everything you know about [the sender] and the circumstances
of the failed message what he might have meant . . . the correct analysis is
an intentionalist one.”17 By comparison, the kinds of clever interpretive
ambiguities that Fish and the legal realists celebrated were more
“obtuse . . . than ingenious.”18
Fish shot back that Posner’s attempt to create a special subcategory
for legal texts changed nothing: after all, philosophy-of-language

12. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE
1 (1989).
13. See id. at 143–60.
14. Fish is, of course, trivially correct if we choose to identify his “interpretive community” with
the country’s 1.2 million practicing lawyers. Attorneys in the U.S., WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Attorneys_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/R95G-LTGA]. However, this number is
far too large to place any useful limit on the number of viewpoints. Fish would presumably reply that
professional hierarchies and social structures play a much bigger role in defining which opinions are
respectable. But there is almost no empirical evidence on how much narrowing actually happens,
suggesting that the mechanism might well be too weak to matter.
15. See Levinson, supra note 6, at 384 (While one can appeal to “Kuhnian communities” of
shared conventions, we should be “acutely aware of the contingency of such judgements.”). Fish
himself seemed to welcome such power, arguing that literary theory “might play a role in altering the
way in which the legal world is constructed by altering the way in which legal actors conceive of their
activities.” FISH, supra note 12, at 308.
16. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 240.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 242. Posner’s specific ire was directed to a hypothetical argument that the Constitution
did not literally require presidents to be 35 years old, but only have “the maturity and station in life of
an average 35 year old.” Id.
OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES
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arguments applied to all texts whatsoever.19 Formally, this bit of Type 2
logic was irreproachable. All the same, Posner had a point. While
philosophy-of-language arguments showed that variant interpretations
were possible, they said nothing at all about which ones were likely. This
created a deep conflict with the nearly universal perception that some legal
and also literary interpretations are enormously better than others.20 This
mattered, Posner explained, since narrowing the analysis to “better”
readings could usefully “box in” judges’ discretion even when some
ambiguity remained.21
Thirty years later, legal scholars continue to wrestle with essentially
the same arguments.22 In the meantime, literary theory has begun moving
beyond narrow philosophy-of-language approaches to consider empirical
evidence that humans’ response to reading produces measurable changes
in the brain.23 This suggests that texts matter, rebutting accusations that
literature is merely the “constructed handmaiden of sociopolitical
power.”24 But in that case, it is also reasonable to ask whether Type 1
processes favor some textual interpretations compared to others.
Remarkably, recent science strongly supports this conjecture.
II. THE SCIENCE
Critics have cited the subjective emotion of beauty as evidence for
an underlying unity in how humans understand painting, music, literature,
and the other “sister arts” since the eighteenth century.25 However, the
19. FISH, supra note 12, at 303–04 (rejecting Posner’s distinction because interpretation is
“indistinguishable from what you think, in advance, the text is for and also from what you take to be
your relation to it.”) (emphasis in original).
20. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 9 (“The fact that interpreters may have interesting, productive
disputes about textual meaning does not prevent agreement among practitioners whose authority has
been accredited in various ways that some interpretations are less credible than others . . . .”);
Levinson, supra note 6, at 384 (In law, not even “radical critics defend the position that any
interpretation is as good as any other.”).
21. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 4, at 13 (explaining that even pragmatist judges are
“boxed in, as other judges are, by . . . [factors including] a due regard for the integrity of the written
word in contracts and statutes”).
22. For two recent contributions, see, e.g., Mark Kingwell, Let’s Ask Again: Is the Law Like
Literature, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 317, 317–52 (1994); James Seaton, Law and Literature: Works,
Theory, and Criticism, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 479, 479–07 (1999).
23. See, e.g., Nancy Easterlin, Review: How Literature Plays With the Brain, 39 PHILOSOPHY &
LITERATURE 1, 267–70 (2015).
24. Id. at 267.
25. See G. GABRIELLE STARR, FEELING BEAUTY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF AESTHETIC
EXPERIENCE 4 (2013) (“Most theories of the Sister Arts have focused resolutely and explicitly on the
subjective dimensions of response.”). Starr also stated that “the idea that there is a single autonomous
domain in which we might discuss or reason about the visual arts, literature, music, imagination,
beauty, the sublime, or even the vulgarly awful is an invention of the eighteenth century.” Id. at xii–
xiii.

2018]

Beauty is Truth and Truth Beauty

137

same perception also occurs in objective subjects like mathematics26 and
physics27 along with a wide variety of mundane tasks.28 Probably the most
instructive example is chess, where masters learn to use Type 1 reasoning
to identify the most important and creative possibilities with a single
glance.29 Such examples argue that unconscious intuition is not just
aesthetic, but also plays a key role in practical problem-solving.
The outlines of what we now call Type 1 thought were already clear
by 1821. That year, the poet and political radical Percy Bysshe Shelley
wrote a celebrated essay contrasting “reason,” which he argued was
limited to “algebraical relations” between known thoughts,30 with a second
faculty of “imagination” that was alone capable of making other thoughts
from existing ones,31 and deploying them “according to a certain rhythm
and order which may be called the beautiful and the good.”32 Anticipating
Freud by half a century, he went on to link imagination with what we now
call the unconscious.33 Less convincingly, Shelley also anticipated Jung
by claiming that aesthetic insights were universal, originating in the mind
of God.34
Two centuries of scientific research have refined and formalized
these insights. Today, the characteristic Type 1 operations specialize in
pattern recognition and the mental processes variously called “judgment,”
26. Bertrand Russell, The Study of Mathematics, in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC AND OTHER ESSAYS
60 (3d ed. 1976) (“[M]athematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty.”); see
also Vicky Neal, Mathematics is Beautiful (No, Really), THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 17, 2017),
http://theconversation.com/mathematics-is-beautiful-no-really-72921[https://perma.cc/GR8N-E258].
27. P.A.M. Dirac, The Relation Between Mathematics and Physics, 59 PROC. R. SOC.
EDINBURGH 1, 122–29 (1939) (arguing that workers seeking the fundamental laws of nature “should
strive mainly for mathematical beauty”), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e69a/466c2576a4de2e77dd
7bcb77c1f2ad5b2d6d.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC7R-2MQZ]. See generally FRANK WILCZEK, A
BEAUTIFUL QUESTION: FINDING NATURE’S DEEP DESIGN (2015) (documenting use of “beautiful
thoughts” in constructing scientific theories from Pythagoras to particle physics). Significantly,
physicists’ subjective experience of beauty is classically Type 1: in Dirac’s phrase, it “cannot be
defined, any more than beauty in art can be defined[.]” Dirac, supra, at 122–29.
28. KAHNEMAN, supra note 2, at 236–37 (Firefighters can intuit exactly when a house will
collapse without knowing how they do it.).
29. See id. at 238–39.
30. Percy Bysshe Shelley, A Defence of Poetry or Remarks Suggested by an Essay Entitled “The
Four Ages of Poetry,” in SHELLEY’S POETRY AND PROSE 480 (1977). The essay first appeared
posthumously in PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, ESSAYS, LETTERS FROM ABROAD, TRANSLATIONS AND
FRAGMENTS (1840).
31. Shelley, supra note 30, at 480; see also id. at 503 (Imagination allows humans to create “new
materials of knowledge, and power, and pleasure.”).
32. Id. at 503.
33. Id. at 506 (The poetic imagination “differs from logic, that it is not subject to the controul of
the active powers of the mind, and that its birth and recurrence have no necessary connexion with the
consciousness or will.”).
34. Id. at 485 (Aesthetics are defined “as existing in the mind of the creator, which is itself the
image of all other minds.”).
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“intuition,” and “aesthetics.”35 These are very unlike the brain’s alternative
Type 2 thought process, variously called “reason” and “logic.”36 The
hallmark of the latter is that it can be articulated, reduced to unambiguous
instructions and, as Alan Turing predicted, implemented by machines.37
Crucially, much of the best evidence remains subjective: Type 1 and Type
2 methods simply feel different. For example, aesthetic reasoning is
routinely described as unconscious, automatic, and having little sense of
effort or control.38 This means that even when we recognize a pattern, we
often cannot say why. Sometimes the mind’s logical, Type 2 methods can
replicate the insight, sometimes they can’t.39
The next Section reviews what scientists have learned about the
nature of Type 1 judgments, focusing on the surprising result that artists
from different societies often make the same aesthetic judgments,
regardless of the cultures that they were born into.
A. Type Intuition: Aesthetics and Fast Thinking
Professor Armstrong argues that Type 1 reasoning enters reading
through the “recognition of patterns.”40 This implies that readers move
both upward (by assembling details into overall patterns) and downward
(by using the overall pattern to make sense of details).41 From this
standpoint, legal reasoning—which consists almost entirely of finding and
35. See generally CARLOS E. PEREZ, ARTIFICIAL INTUITION: THE IMPROBABLE DEEP LEARNING
REVOLUTION (2018).
36. Id. at 96.
37. See Turing Machine, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine [https://
perma.cc/PH3J-H985]. Turing’s logic was nicely anticipated by the poet W.B. Yeats, who noticed
after refusing a political debate
that all the arguments which had occurred to me earlier were said by somebody or other.
Logic is a machine; one can leave it to itself, and unhelped it will force those present to
exhaust the subject. The fool is as likely as the sage to speak the appropriate answer to any
assertion. If an argument is forgotten, someone will go home miserable. You throw your
money on the table, and you receive so much change.
BARRY SHIELS, W.B. YEATS AND WORLD LITERATURE: THE SUBJECT OF POETRY 166 (2015) (quoting
Yeats’ 1908 journal entry).
38. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 2, at 20.
39. Remarkably, the dichotomy between logic and pattern recognition also applies to machines.
Computers built around human-supplied Type 2 logic are wonderful at arithmetic but do a terrible job
of recognizing patterns. Conversely, “neural network” architectures that learn by interacting with the
environment have the opposite problem: they are good at recognizing patterns but incapable of long
division. PEREZ, supra note 35, at 96.
40. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 58.
41. Id. at 54–55. Armstrong provides a detailed description of this dynamic, which he calls the
“hermeneutic spiral.” Id. The key insight is that interpretation requires “the reciprocal construction of
an overall order and its constituent parts, the overarching arrangement making sense of the details by
their relation to one another, even as their configuration only emerges as the parts fit together.” Id. at
54. This leads to characteristic “to-and-fro adjustments, between the details of the work and the
configurations one expects (and may or may not find).” Id. at 55.
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comparing patterns across different levels of text42—is just one example
of how the brain uses its exquisitely refined pattern-spotting circuits to
make sense of the world.
1. Brain Imaging
We have already said that the perception of beauty has been reported
not just for art, but also for mathematics, physics, and a wide variety of
practical tasks. The advent of brain imaging has given this subjective claim
a physical basis in the brain. So far, most of this work has concentrated on
mapping regions that respond to visual art.43 However, images of the
brain’s aesthetic responses to music44 and mathematics45 turn out to be
closely similar.
The more general lesson is that the images hint—however
coarsely46—at how thought can be identified with physical structures in
the brain. This viewpoint is particularly natural for Type 1 reasoning,
which can be convincingly described as a process of “wiring” neurons
together into “circuits” that have been optimized to detect specific
patterns. Whereas most sensations are simply noise,47 coherent patterns
stimulate the brain’s pleasure centers by confirming existing neural
connections and forming new ones.48 This has obvious survival value in a
world where it is important both to exploit previously-discovered patterns
and to consider new ones.
42. See infra Section IV.
43. STARR, supra note 25, at 34 (“The first neuroscientists interested in aesthetics were primarily
concerned with visual art, for vision, as the sense most accessible to behavioral evaluation, has been
the most robustly understood area of perception.”).
44. S.E. Trehub, Human Processing Predispositions and Musical Universals, in THE ORIGINS
OF MUSIC 427–28 (2000); STARR, supra note 25, at 48; Tomohiro Ishizu & Semir Zeki, Toward a
Brain-Based Theory of Beauty, 6 PLOS ONE 7, 42 (2011) (Aesthetic reactions to music and painting
produce effects in areas of the brain that are involved with emotion processing, although the data “do
not preclude subtle differences in the timing of neural activity.”).
45. S. Zeki, J.P. Romaya, D.M.T. Benincasa & M.F. Atiyah, The Experience of Mathematical
Beauty and Its Neural Correlates, FRONTIERS IN HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE, Feb. 2014, at 1, 10 (finding
a “very close” though “not perfect” correspondence for mathematical, musical, and visual beauty in
the same regions of the brain).
46. For the foreseeable future, the images are too crude to identify individual neurons, or resolve
the millisecond-by-millisecond changes that drive brain function. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 4; see
also Keith Sawyer, Brain Imaging: What Good Is It? Brain Imaging Promises Much, but Offers Little
(At Least, so Far), PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/
zig-zag/201310/brain-imaging-what-good-is-it [https://perma.cc/EUV2-AAND].
47. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 15 (“Harmony and dissonance in art are defined not only by
each other but also by their opposition to a third concept—noise . . . . The human brain’s capacities
for synthesis are not unlimited . . . . Some stimuli simply are not noticed. If they are perceived but
cannot be processed, they are noise.”).
48. Id. at 50 (“There is interesting experimental evidence that the making and breaking of
neuronal connections stimulates the expression of neurotransmitters strongly associated with pleasure
in ways that no doubt affect aesthetic experiences.”).
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The brain’s other characteristic strategy is to recycle established
circuits for new tasks.49 But in that case, reasoning for the new purpose
remains hostage to maintaining the original function—a brain that uses the
same circuits for tort law and crossing the street will stop improving the
former when it compromises safety. This suggests that we may sometimes
find ourselves locked into certain perceptions, although the brain often
finds workarounds.50
2. Neural Networks
Finally, our understanding of Type 1 pattern recognition has been
deeply influenced by artificial intelligence research. While neural network
computers do not claim to duplicate actual brain architectures, they
nevertheless show what happens when large numbers of neuron-like
(multiple input, non-linear response) circuits are wired together to find
patterns.51 Unlike traditional approaches based on Type 2 logic supplied
by humans, neural networks learn by trial-and-error, constantly rewiring
themselves to make pattern detection more efficient.52 But while they
sometimes make predictions that no human can duplicate, their reasoning
often cannot be articulated or even understood by us. Indeed, some make
predictions that no human can duplicate.53 What makes this strange is that
every neural network can be formally reduced to a set of linear algebra
49. Reading short stories activates the same regions that the reader would use if they were
performing, imagining, or observing the protagonist’s actions in real life. Nicole K. Speer, Jeremy R.
Reynolds, Khena M. Swallow & Jeffrey M. Zacks, Reading Stories Activates Neural Representations
of Visual and Motor Experiences, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 989 (2009).
50. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 36–37 (Girl whose normal left brain region for recognizing
letters had been damaged was able to develop the mirror image right brain region for the same
purpose.).
51. PEREZ, supra note 35. Readers can build intuition about how neural networks work by
reading Anderson’s lucid, albeit rigorous account of the so-called “Perceptron” machines built in the
1950s. JAMES A. ANDERSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO NEURAL NETWORKS (1995). The basic
architecture featured three types of element: Sensors (S) which detect signals from the external world,
Associative Cells (A) that are wired to multiple sensors to detect simple patterns (e.g. lines, triangles)
and Relational Cells (R) that are wired to multiple A cells to detect higher-order patterns like houses
or fire trucks. Crucially, the A and R cells exhibit “threshold,” i.e. only fire when incoming signals
exceed some predetermined value. The machine then evolves to maximize the probability that one and
only one R cell will fire when the desired pattern appears. This is done by rewiring the connections
between the A and R cells each time detection fails. Specifically, A cells that sent out a positive signal
produce a higher output the next time, while A cells that sent out a negative signal have their strength
reduced. This makes it more likely that the relevant R cell will guess right next time. Id. at 220. The
same basic architecture can also be modified to solve more abstract problems, for example creating
categories that parsimoniously distinguish different types of events. Id. at 209–38.
52. See Fabio Ciucci, AI and Deep Learning, Simply Explained, KD NUGGETS (July 2017)
(Neural network program trained on data from 700,000 patients can predict schizophrenia onset better
than humans.), https://www.kdnuggets.com/2017/07/ai-deep-learning-explained-simply.html [https://
perma.cc/2EAV-BSLC].
53. Id.
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equations.54 Despite its formal clarity, the mathematics is much too
complicated for our Type 2 selves to understand.55
B. Universality
Philosophy-of-language arguments have difficulty explaining why
one interpretation should be better than any other. An improved theory
must add assumptions that break this symmetry. Fish’s suggestion of an
elite interpretive community is one (unpalatable) way to do this. This
Article starts from different evidence showing that certain judgments are
universal, i.e. that human experts often make the same Type 1 choices no
matter what culture they were born into. Crucially, this universality
implies that experts from any one country share common ground no matter
how much they disagree about culture and politics.
1. Objective Problems
The idea that Type 1 perceptions in fields like physics or
mathematics are universal seems entirely reasonable. Type 1 methods are,
after all, optimized to spot patterns. In fields where the physical world
defines a single truth, any sense of beauty which reliably points to that
truth must similarly converge on a unique pattern. For example, we would
expect aliens who evolved on other planets to arrive at much the same
understanding of physics that we have.56 Probably the best-studied
example of how external reality forces convergence comes from studying
how humans from widely separate cultures interpret random ink blots
(“Rorschach patterns”) as people, animals, or insects. Of the thirteen most
popular responses found in North America, nine appear to be universal,
meaning that they elicit similar responses at similar rates across Europe,57

54. Id. (Machine learning “computations are visible, but too many to make a human-readable
summary.”); Sean Captain, We Don’t Always Know What AI is Thinking—And That Can Be Scary,
FAST COMPANY (Nov. 15, 2016) (quoting IBM’s Cognitive Computing Officer: “It’s not clear even
from a technical perspective that every aspect of AI algorithms can be understood by humans”),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3064368/we-dont-always-know-what-ai-is-thinking-and-that-can-bescary [https://perma.cc/VS3B-685E].
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, FERNANDO B. MORINGO & WILLIAM G. WAGNER, THE
FEYNMAN LECTURES ON GRAVITATION 2 (1995) et passim (arguing that Venusian physicists would
eventually discover gravity even if clouds made the stars invisible).
57. Anne Andronikov-Sanglade, Use of the Rorschach Comprehensive System in Europe: State
of the Art, in HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL AND MULTICULTURAL PERSONALITY ASSESSMENTS
338–39 (2000) (reporting French data); see Eugenia V. Vinet, The Rorschach Comprehensive System
in Iberoamerica, in HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL AND MULTICULTURAL PERSONALITY
ASSESSMENTS 347–49 (2000) (reporting data for Spain and Portugal).
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Japan,58 and Latin America.59 As Professor Weiner remarks, this
universality follows from the fact that alternative interpretations would
require “a substantial distortion or misrepresentation.”60 In these cases, at
least, “[t]he boundaries between realistic and unrealistic perception are
universal and not culture bound.”61
2. Aesthetic Convergence
The harder question is whether purely aesthetic responses can be
similarly universal. Psychologists first proposed experiments to probe how
humans make aesthetic judgments in the 1870s.62 However, early
researchers soon reported that average people do not share aesthetic
judgments across cultures.63 This finding seems to have discouraged
further research until Professor Irvin L. Child took a second look in the
1960s.64 While Child confirmed that lay opinion does indeed depend on
culture, this was not true for experts.
Child’s method depended on asking native artists to compare similar
paintings. In each case, American experts had overwhelmingly agreed that
one design was aesthetically superior to the other.65 In his most famous
study, Child showed pairs of both abstract and representational paintings
to thirty-six Japanese potters in small rural villages. They agreed with
American Ivy League experts 63% of the time. Significantly, the odds of
this happening by chance were less than one percent.66 By comparison, the
same Ivy League experts’ chances of agreeing with a Connecticut high
school student were just 47%—indistinguishable from a simple coin
toss.67 Child and his coauthors went on to document similar results for

58. IRVING B. WEINER, PRINCIPLES OF RORSCHACH INTERPRETATION 52 (2d ed. 2003)
(reporting Japanese data).
59. Vinet, supra note 57, at 350–52 (reporting data for Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela).
60. WEINER, supra note 58, at 53.
61. Id.
62. Gustav Fechner proposed, but did not implement, an experimental agenda to explore the
psychology of aesthetics in the 1870s. See Irvin L. Child & Rosaline S. Schwartz, Exposure to Better
and Poorer Art, 2 J. AESTHETIC EDUC. 111, 118 (1968).
63. Irvin L. Child & Leon Siroto, BaKwele and American Esthetic Evaluations Compared, 4
ETHNOLOGY 349, 350 (1965).
64. Id. at 349 (collecting pre-Sixties literature and concluding that psychologists had tried
experimental tests of aesthetic relativity “to an astonishingly small degree”). Child taught his
introductory psychology class to me and several hundred other Yale freshmen in 1975.
65. Id. at 350. Child took great pains to test experts who had never been exposed to Western
culture—a process much easier in the 1960s than it is today.
66. Sumiko Iwao & Irvin L. Child, Comparison of Esthetic Judgments by American Experts and
by Japanese Potters, 68 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27, 30 (1966).
67. Id. at 32.

2018]

Beauty is Truth and Truth Beauty

143

isolated communities in Japan,68 Fiji,69 West Africa,70 Ecuador, Peru, and
Puerto Rico.71 Subsequent studies have generally confirmed these
findings72 but added little beyond trying to localize universality in
particular parts of the image.73
Child’s universality only occurs in specific circumstances. First, it is
limited to humans (“experts”) who have spent large parts of their lives
making aesthetic choices. Second, the effect is modest, just 10% more than
a coin toss. This makes it nearly invisible in everyday life unless and until
humans organize surveys to look for it. Third, Child’s method uses similar
images and therefore makes no claim to large choices, say that a Picasso
painting has more aesthetic value than an African folk mask.
3. Origins
It is natural to ask what causes universality. Given that the effect only
applies to experts, learning must play a role. This immediately rules out
explanations in which evolution has hardwired aesthetic preferences
directly into the brain. Instead, Child argued that artists learn by
contemplation, independently discovering “similar facts about the
adequacy of particular works for satisfying aesthetic interests.”74
68. A subsequent study tested Japanese subjects from seven additional crafts including flower
arranging, tea ceremony, and textile dying. Sumiko Iwao, Irvin L. Child & Miguel Garcia, Further
Evidence of Agreement Between Japanese and American Esthetic Evaluations, 18 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
11, 15 (1969).
69. C.S. Ford, E. Terry Prothro & Irvin L. Child, Some Transcultural Comparisons of Esthetic
Judgment, 68 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 26 (1966) (Six subjects agreed with American experts 78% of the
time; significant at the one percent level.). The authors also found a similar trend among four craftsmen
from the Greek Islands, but this was statistically insignificant. Id. at 23–25.
70. Child & Siroto, supra note 63, at 351. The agreement on African masks was significant at
the one percent level.
71. See Irvin L. Child, The Psychological Meaning of Aesthetic Judgments, in VISUAL ARTS
RESEARCH 53 (1983) (describing three small Latin American studies).
72. Julian P. Renoult, The Evolution of Aesthetics: A Review of Models, in AESTHETICS AND
NEUROSCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC AND ARTISTIC PERSPECTIVES 282 (Zoï Kapoula & Marine Vernet eds.,
2016) (“Many subsequent studies have concurred with this view that aesthetic preferences and beauty
are, at least in part, universal and innate.”). One recent study shows that art students are much more
likely than lay audiences to choose abstract paintings by professional painters over similar works by
children and animals. Though seemingly unaware of Child’s work, their result neatly reproduces his
strong distinction between experts and lay audiences. See Angelina Hawley-Dolan & Ellen Winner,
Seeing the Mind Behind the Art: People Can Distinguish Abstract Expressionist Paintings From
Highly Similar Paintings by Children, Chimps, Monkeys, and Elephants, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 435, 440
(2011).
73. The strategy is particularly tempting in an era when computers make it easy to decompose
images into mathematically precise “Fourier” and “Power Spectra” components. See, e.g., Renoult,
supra note 72, at 282; Wilfried van Damme, Universality and Cultural Particularity in Visual
Aesthetics, in BEING HUMANS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY IN
TRANSDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 258 (Neil Roughley ed., 2000).
74. Child & Siroto, supra note 63, at 33.
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However, this still left the question of what generates these underlying
“aesthetic interests” to begin with. This was probably unanswerable in the
1960s. Today, however, we know that the brain’s pleasure centers reward
us for forming new neural connections and using old ones.75 In this view,
art is a form of play designed to question our established views of the
world and try out new ones.
For now at least, Child’s hypothesis is not the only possibility.
Aesthetic convergence could also be driven by a self-selection effect in
which certain personality types preferentially become potters. In principle,
this can be checked by testing how peoples’ aesthetic responses change
before and after they become experts, although little work has been done
in this area.76
4. Education and Socialization
Child showed that students could be taught to improve their test
scores by simulating taste, i.e. guessing what experts would say.77
However, scores rose faster when instructors focused on showing students
how to appreciate art and asked for sincere (unsimulated) responses.78
Significantly, Child taught this aesthetic sense using the traditional
methods of art criticism, i.e. giving students Type 1, non-algorithmic hints
about what to look for.79
Child’s universality research was limited to art. However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the sense of beauty in physics similarly flows from
prolonged contemplation without any need for special education or
indoctrination. As the physicist P.A.M. Dirac remarked, people who study
mathematics “usually have no trouble in appreciating [beauty].”80
75. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 48–49.
76. Child and Schwartz did perform a small-scale experiment which asked nineteen students to
examine paired images for eight hours apiece. While they found no evidence of learning, this was not
surprising. Child’s artists had invested orders of magnitude more time making aesthetic choices. Child
& Schwartz, supra note 62.
77. Id. at 112 (School children who had been told which images experts preferred could be taught
to distinguish “fairly well” which art was considered “better.”).
78. Irvin L. Child & Rosaline S. Schwartz, Exploring the Teaching of Art Values, 1 J. AESTHETIC
EDUC. 41 (1966).
79. Child found that students made “impressive” progress when he showed them seven
principles, each illustrated with pairs that did and did not follow the suggested advice. Id. at 51. Child’s
principles were selectivity, organization, consistency, variety, aliveness, use of decoration, and
appropriate use of elements. Id. at 50–51. These cryptic labels were explained through detailed—but
far from algorithmic—definitions which demand further judgment from the reader. For example, Child
defined “Use of Decoration” as follows: “Good decoration must suit the object. It must not ‘fight’ with
the object as a whole in line, color, textures, shapes, or forms. Good decoration must seem an essential
part of the object or work of art and not look ‘stuck on’ as an afterthought. Good decoration does not
ask attention for itself but permits the entire object or work of art to remain most important.” Id.
80. Dirac, supra note 27, at 122–23. Mathematician Vicki Neal similarly stresses the central
importance of contemplation in learning to appreciate beauty:
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III. TYPE 1 THINKING IN LAW
It is clear that Type 1 insights play a significant role in fields ranging
from the visual arts to mathematics. However, the relative importance of
Type 1 and Type 2 processes varies dramatically by discipline. This makes
it natural to see law as an intermediate case along a continuum between art
(principally Type 1) to science (mostly Type 2). This Section collects
evidence for Type 1 reasoning in law and traces the specific mechanisms
that let it decide particular cases.81
A. The Subjective Experience of Law
Legal realism’s most notorious failing is that it ignores how lawyers
actually practice and experience law.82 Yet subjective experience was
historically the first and most important clue that common brain functions
were at work in fields from painting to physics. This makes it natural to
look for similar evidence of Type 1 thinking in lawyering’s most basic and
defining function: writing.
1. Writing
Non-legal writing is already deeply entangled with Type 1 thought.
This is evident from, among other things, the fact that finding the right
words is largely unconscious, brings pleasure, and is almost never
I cannot find a piece of mathematics beautiful unless I first understand it properly—and
that means it can take a while for me to appreciate the aesthetic qualities.
I don’t think this unique to mathematics. There are pieces of music, buildings, pieces
of visual art where I have not at first appreciated their beauty or elegance—and it is only
by persevering, by grappling with the ideas, that I have come to perceive the beauty.
For me, one of the joys of teaching undergraduates is watching them develop their
own appreciation of the beauty of mathematics.
Neal, supra note 26.
81. Brain imaging researchers have yet to investigate legal reasoning. However, the relevant
techniques are being developed, most notably in experiments that image subjects’ brains in real time
as they proceed through short stories. Speer, Reynolds, Swallow & Zacks, supra note 49. The
additional difficulty for law is that asking subjects to make aesthetic choices for concepts like
“nonobviousness” requires so much education that they could be inadvertently socialized to give
particular answers. One workaround would be to look for universality in self-contained documents
like contracts.
82. As Prof. Solum remarks,
[F]rom a perspective internal to the law, the claim that judging is politics all the way down
seems absurd, because it fails to account for the phenomenology of judging. Judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars do not experience legal decisionmaking as the exercise of
discretion based on politics. This point is actually common ground between legal scholars
as diverse as Professor Ronald Dworkin, who believed that there was a legally correct
outcome in every dispute, and Professor Duncan Kennedy, who defends the view that law
is deeply political.
Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and American Legal
Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2473–74 (2014) (book review).
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reducible to Type 2 algorithms. That said, we seldom stop to realize just
how much work Type 1 processes do. Consider this deceptively simple
phrase: “A lovely little old rectangular green French silver whittling
knife.”83 Move a single word and you immediately see that something has
gone badly wrong. Yet no one ever taught you an explicit Type 2 rule, and
figuring it out is tedious84—so tedious in fact that you begin to wonder
how the mind manages to write whole chapters and books. Sometimes this
process is purely aesthetic. But it also extends to knowing one’s audience
and how best to communicate.
2. Legal Writing
It is difficult to generalize about how writing’s Type 1 content
changes when the focus shifts to law. On the one hand, legal documents
can be highly algorithmic, most notably in architecting elaborately
interlocking definitions and borrowed terms of art. At the same time, they
also pose Type 1 problems that lay writing does not. The characteristic
lawyering activity is writing rules—for example, legislation, bilateral
contracts, and court opinions—that will be interpreted by strangers to
decide disputes that are only imperfectly anticipated. While there are better
and worse ways to do this, they all depend on reducing massive amounts
of life experience to Type 1 insights. But once lawyers learn to write, it is
only natural that their brains will commandeer the same circuits to
interpret what other lawyers mean. Like Child’s potters, the artist becomes
the critic. Finally, the circle closes with lawyers recycling their interpretive
experience to improve their drafting.
All of this makes lawyers different from the average educated
layman. For us, writing is an installment in what Dworkin saw as an
endless chain of documents.85 It is not enough to memorialize the present;
we must also consider how our words could change the interpretation of
earlier documents and facilitate accidental or deliberate misunderstanding
in the future.86
83. MARK FORSYTH, THE ELEMENTS OF ELOQUENCE: SECRETS OF THE PERFECT TURN OF
PHRASE (2013).
84. English adjective/noun combinations are invariably ordered opinion-size-age-shape-colororigin-material-purpose-noun. Id.
85. See Dworkin, supra note 10, at 158–62.
86. The depth of these professional instincts is most visible when lawyers collaborate with
educated lay people. For the past few years I have worked with academic biologists to screen proposed
experiments against so-called “ethical, legal, and social implications.” Given that our opinions are
preserved with an eye to publication, the overall purpose closely resembles a common law court. Yet
my lay colleagues seldom see this. Some offer explanations that “prove too much” by facially
invalidating large swathes of federal law, or else framing rules that would allow almost any future
experiment to go forward. Others give opaque explanations that say almost nothing about what the
panel would accept next time. And still others propose fact tests that would be difficult or impossible
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3. Universality
We have argued that scientific intuitions converge because there is
only one physical world. We cannot know whether there is some similarly
uniquely best way to write legal documents. But if there is, there cannot
be many, and we should expect practitioners to converge on similar
lessons in any society where “lawyering” is a discernible activity. In the
modern world this arguably includes every nation on earth.87
The deeper question is whether universality goes beyond these
shared experiences. Child’s work suggests that we should expect aesthetic
intuition to operate even when the experience of lawyering teaches no life
lessons at all. The joy which many formalists take in verbal gymnastics
points strongly in this direction.88
4. Normative Implications
The existence of universality across countries necessarily implies
that lawyers within any one country share common ground about how to
interpret legal documents. Furthermore, this ground must exist despite the
deep conflicts over values and goals that all societies face. This makes any
standards based on this common ground completely democratic, at least if
we assume that laypeople would agree with the experts given sufficient
time and study.
This normative argument is sufficiently important that we should
worry about possible loopholes. The first is empirical. Pending further
research, universality could still turn out to be a selection effect, i.e. that
legal careers attract people whose values are systematically different from
average humans. In that case, agreed standards among lawyers would not
represent the broader society after all. Second, assuming that universality
is learned, its lessons cannot be broader than the experience of lawyering
to implement in practice. My point is not that I handle these issues better than my colleagues, though
I think I do. Rather, it is that they do not see these pitfalls in the first place.
87. But see James Pearson, North Korea’s Only Foreign-Founded Law Firm Suspends
Operations, REUTERS (July 31, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-lawyer/northkoreas-only-foreign-founded-law-firm-suspends-operations-idUSKCN10C1A1
[https://perma.cc/
K6PE-J9DS] (reporting that “most” of North Korea’s 8,000 lawyers work for the state).
88. Consider, for example, Federal Circuit Chief Judge Helen Nies’ argument that the tests for
patent law’s “non-obviousness” and “substantiality” requirements should be identical. Roton Barrier,
Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J., concurring). This made little
sense from a policy or statutory interpretation perspective, since legal standards that address distinct
economic problems should normally be independent of one another. See Ted O’Donoghue, Suzanne
Scotchmer & Jacques-François Thisse, Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological
Progress, 7 J. OF ECONS. AND MGMT. STRATEGY 1 (1998) (analyzing optimal pairings of “nonobviousness” and “substantiality” standards for different industries). But it did let Nies argue that “[a]
substitution in the patented invention cannot be both nonobvious and insubstantial.” Roton Barrier,
79 F.3d at 1128. Here at least, the pleasure of an attractive syllogism seems to have outweighed all
other considerations.
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itself. This probably includes a bias toward focusing on the rights and
goals of individuals. This could sometimes slant legal reasoning toward,
say, capitalist values compared to socialist ones.
B. Mechanics: Finding Alternative Patterns
The question remains just how Type 1 intuition enters legal
reasoning to decide cases. Unlike most of the existing literature,89 we
decline the (likely impossible) task of reducing legal judgment to
completely determinate, Type 2 rules. This Section emphasizes how legal
research uses Type 1 methods to find new patterns within legal texts.
Suppose that you represent a client and that your opponent has cited
some rule that establishes liability. In the physical world there can only be
one truth, ensuring that every pattern must be consistent with every other
pattern. Legal doctrine, on the other hand, is assembled piecemeal by
many hands over time. This implies that patterns can and often will be
inconsistent. The advocate’s job is to find a pattern that favors her client
and persuade a court that this version is the attractive one.90
There are basically three ways for legal researchers to develop
patterns. First, the advocate can drill down into particular words and
phrases, the same tactic that led Bill Clinton to argue, “It depends on what
the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.”91 This is often fairly easy, since
dictionaries invariably offer several synonyms for every definition, each
of which recursively leads to still more definitions and synonyms.
Second, acts that are forbidden by one rule may sometimes be
authorized and even required by other bodies of law. Here, the main
difficulty is to find a second rule broad enough to cover the behavior at
issue.92 Sometimes this can be easy. For example, intellectual property
gives recipients a “lawful monopoly,” while antitrust law holds that some
(poorly-specified) business methods for exploiting patents are illegal. The
89. For an exhaustive survey of the existing jurisprudence literature, see, e.g., Precedent and
Analogy in Legal Reasoning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 20, 2006), https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/.
90. Scholars have long recognized this incoherence, perhaps most famously in the so-called
“canons of construction” for interpreting statutes. Professor Llewellyn famously argued that every
canon has a counter-canon, so that judges end with the same discretion they had to begin with. Karl
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
91. Timothy Noah, Bill Clinton and the Meaning of “Is,” SLATE (Sept. 13, 1998), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/1998/09/bill_clinton_and_the_meaning_
of_is.html [https://perma.cc/K2KU-2UMD].
92. The potential for conflict grows when courts are permitted to include supplemental sources
like common sense, custom, and public policy in their inquiry. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE,
supra note 4, at 287. One of formalism’s most appealing features is that it limits judges to legal texts,
making it that much harder to find conflicts.

2018]

Beauty is Truth and Truth Beauty

149

result is that there is no gray area: if you guess wrong you not only lose
your intellectual property reward, you commit a felony.93
Finally, advocates can step back to ask whether the proposed
interpretation conflicts with the statute’s other provisions or overall
purpose. Such inconsistencies are fairly common since no complex text is
ever entirely consistent and most legislators are careless.94 More
fundamentally, different sections may be drafted by different legislators
with different intent, so that the overall statutory scheme may never have
existed in any one mind at all. Then too, legislators cannot anticipate every
fact pattern, so judges sometimes find themselves confronting what
Professor Lessig calls “latent ambiguities”95 that no one anticipated. The
Mann Act,96 RICO,97 and federal wire fraud98 are all examples of statutes
that turned out to cover many more fact patterns than Congress anticipated.
C. Legal Judgment: Choosing the Best Pattern
We have argued that advocates who look hard enough will almost
always find competing patterns. At this point, legal reasoning consists of
picking the “best” or “most convincing” one. If law were a Type 2 activity,
good lawyers could stand at a white board and demonstrate the right choice
to everyone. But of course, this is precisely what they cannot do.99 Instead,
the best they can do is point out qualitative reasons to choose their pattern
in much the same way that art critics admire some works compared to
others.100 American lawyers typically refer to these characteristically Type
1 narratives as “judgment.” A legal realist would presumably call this a
smokescreen. However, our “green knife” example argues that Type 1
93. M.J. Adelman & F.K. Juenger, Patent-Antitrust: Patent Dynamics and Field-of-Use
Licensing, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 308 (1975).
94. Statutes and constitutions are written in haste by busy people not always of great ability
or diligence, and we are not privileged to ignore the hasty and hackneyed provisions and
reserve our attention for the greatest. Moreover, they are products of a committee (the
legislature) rather than of a single mind, and of a committee whose numerous members
may have divergent objectives . . . . To suppose that its every word probably has
significance, that every statute is a seemless whole, misconceives the legislative process.
POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 248.
95. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 189 (2d ed. 2006).
96. Eric Weiner, The Long, Colorful History of the Mann Act, NPR (Mar. 11, 2008), https://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88104308.
97. Harold Selan, Interpreting RICO’s “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” Requirement After
Sedima: Separate Schemes, Episodes or Related Acts?, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1987).
98. K. Edward Raleigh, Limiting Mail and Wire Fraud’s Scope, 31 CRIM. JUST. 30 (2017).
99. See, e.g., POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 287 (Logic is especially helpless
in the face of “difficult and important cases.”). Id. at 286 (“[M]any legal questions cannot be resolved
by logical or empirical demonstration. After eighty-two years it is impossible to prove that Lochner
was decided wrongly.”).
100. Cf. id. at 288 (“But because the rational arguments of judges, like those of literary critics,
fall short of being conclusive when the dispute is a difficult one to resolve by methods of reason.”).
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thought often processes enormous amounts of data. Anecdotally, at least,
most working lawyers seem to think that judgment conveys valuable
information.101
Education and Socialization
Law-and-literature theorists often invoke “education” and
“socialization” to inject democratic values into Fish’s otherwise elitist
“interpretive community.” By comparison, universality argues for a
humbler role in which education mostly points students to truths they
would eventually discover anyway. As The Paper Chase’s Professor
Kingsfield says,
I call on you, ask you a question and you answer it. Why don’t I just
give you a lecture? Because through my questions, you learn to teach
yourselves. Through this method of questioning and answering,
questioning, answering, we seek to develop in you the ability to
analyze that vast complex set of facts that constitutes the relationships
of members within a given society. Questioning and answering. At
times you may feel that you have found the correct answer. I assure
you that this is a total delusion on your part. You will never find the
correct, absolute and final answer.102

Conversely, universality should make us suspicious of more coercive
approaches, for example the ferocity that first year law professors bring to
instilling the doubtful103 idea that contract law is unthinkable without
“consideration.”104 There is probably no great harm in this: given how
many precedents would have to be uprooted to excise it, the fact that the
concept could be changed is mostly theoretical. But we should worry that
the same power could be used to slant legal judgments toward specific

101. Levinson, supra note 6, at 384 (In law, not even “radical critics defend the position that any
interpretation is as good as any other.”).
102. Quoted in Steven Adelman, Transforming Skulls Full of Mush: Venue Management Law
School, FACILITY MANAGER (Jan. 6, 2015), http://magazine.iavm.org/article/transforming-skulls-fullof-mush-venue-management-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/6AQ4-JUKT].
103. It is remarkable how quickly senior legal scholars drop the conceit that consideration is
inevitable. See, e.g., Comments of Orin K. McMurray, Papers and Discussion Concerning the Redlich
Report, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 91, 110 (1916) (Law professor who variously taught at Columbia,
Michigan, Stanford, and Boalt Law Schools: “Take the doctrine of consideration. A man who is trained
merely in the casebooks is very likely to think that he has here something of a character like revelation,
something fundamental, absolute, like the truths of mathematics. It is that sort of thing we want to get
away from.”).
104. Small wonder that Scott Turow’s fictitious law school memoir chooses consideration to
show not only the sadistic Prof. Perini’s abuse of the Socratic method, but also the narrator’s cleverness
in escaping the trap. S. TUROW, ONE L 192–94 (1977).
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political and cultural outcomes, even if universalism starts to undo these
lessons as soon as students begin practicing law. 105
IV. TOWARD A TYPE 1 THEORY OF LAW: INDIVIDUALS
We have argued that Type 1 thought (a) is centrally important to legal
reasoning, and (b) displays significant universality. The remainder of this
Article assumes these facts and traces their implications for lawyers and
legal institutions. This Section reviews nineteenth century claims that what
we now call Type 1 reasoning should guide policymakers, updates those
theories to accommodate the modern evidence for universality, and asks
how Type 1 thought shapes the subjective experience of lawyering.
Section V builds on these foundations by analyzing how judicial
institutions amplify universality’s comparatively weak signals to establish
a rough approximation to formalism.106
A. Victorian Theory: Shelley, Arnold, and Holmes
The idea that Type 1 thinking should guide law is nearly as old as the
concept of aesthetic or unconscious thought itself. The argument seems to
have originated with Percy Shelley, who claimed in 1821 that “poets are
the unacknowledged legislators of the World.”107 Logic, he argued, was
not strong enough to find solutions to social issues—and particularly not
the largest and most important ones. This implied that reason’s role in
public life, though useful, was mainly to “follow [in] the footsteps of poets,
and copy the sketches of their creations into the book of common life.”108
Shelley’s ideas were only published in 1840, and even then were
slow to diffuse. It took another three decades for poet and critic Matthew
Arnold to state them definitively. For the most part, his Culture and
Anarchy (originally published in 1869) tracks Shelley’s argument, albeit
with new names so that “reason” is relabeled “science,” and “imagination”
becomes “culture.”109 However, Arnold also improved on Shelley by
105. Kales, supra note 103, at 111 (According to the Northwestern Law School professor,
practicing lawyers look to the law of their states, not what law schools think the law should be. “They
never for one moment think of resting the rights of their clients upon Harvard Law School law, or the
law of any other law school.”).
106. For concreteness, we will assume Prof. Child’s 60% universality estimate in what follows.
However, this is probably conservative. First, Child studied visual art, which has no underlying
objective truth for experts to converge on. We have already argued that the experience of writing and
interpreting legal documents provides an additional and more objective standard for lawyers. Second,
Child compared Yale-trained experts to self-taught artists. The convergence would probably have been
greater had the latter group been formally educated the way law students are.
107. Shelley, supra note 30, at 508.
108. Id. at 501.
109. MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 33–34 (Jane Garnett ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2009) (1869) (Science is the “passion, the sheer desire to see things as they are.” Culture by
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admitting that people could disagree about what was beautiful. Building
on his earlier work in literary theory, he argued that critics who repeatedly
compared new art against recognized “great masters” would eventually
reach a consensus.110 This collective refinement was especially valuable
in politics, where it would stop charismatic individuals from leading
society astray on the pattern of the French Revolution.111
B. Updating the Theory
Most of Shelley and Arnold’s logic is still viable today. Nevertheless,
their argument had a significant defect: for aesthetic judgment to guide
law, it must first point in some identifiable direction. But where does this
come from? For Shelley and Arnold writing in the nineteenth century, the
answer was obvious: the criterion of beauty and the good society already
existed in the mind of God.112
The question in the twenty-first century is whether Child’s more
limited and stochastic version of universality can fill this gap. As we argue
below, legal institutions provide a natural mechanism for converting weak
statistical preferences into quasi-determinate rules. The more serious
objection is that Child’s evidence is limited to choices between similar
images. This suggests that a comparable universality in law probably does
not hold for large choices, for example between the U.S. Constitution and
Taiwan’s. That may explain why common law courts try to change as little
doctrine as possible. This restriction is partly enforced by economics: the
amount of effort that advocates spend looking for new patterns is limited
by litigation budgets on the one hand, and judges’ reluctance to learn
elaborate new legal theories on the other. Additionally, the rule is also
codified in the doctrine of stare decisis.113 Significantly, all of these factors
are flexible, implying that courts’ reluctance to make large changes could
undergo at least some evolution over time.114
comparison finds “its origin in the love of perfection. . . . It moves by the force, not merely or primarily
of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good.”).
110. For a detailed account of Arnold’s “touchstone” method of interpretation, see William G.
Crane, The Significance of Mathew Arnold’s Critical Theory 24 (June, 1920) (unpublished master’s
thesis, Iowa State University), http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/4145 [https://perma.cc/42PU-DESB]. Arnold’s
argument anticipated Child’s hypothesis that artisans become experts by making a long series of
aesthetic choices.
111. See ARNOLD, supra note 109, at 51 (“[C]ulture, just because it resists this tendency of
Jacobinism to impose on us a man with limitations and errors of his own along with the true ideas of
which he is the organ, really does the world and Jacobinism itself a service.”).
112. Id. at 34 (“[N]o action or institution can be salutary and stable which are not based on the
will of God.”).
113. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 251 (Courts are loath to abandon
“even patently erroneous interpretations.”).
114. Theoretical physics illustrates how the rules of the game can evolve over time. Down to the
early twentieth century, physicists expected new theories to postulate as few changes as possible. In
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C. The Subjective Experience of Law
Neural network theory teaches that judges’ brains contain elaborate
models of the world. Formally, these encode complex equations that
assign weights to every possible variable. It follows that the advocate’s job
is to supply whatever combinations of data garner the biggest response
given the judge’s limited appetite for learning new patterns. If both
advocates knew the judge’s underlying equation exactly, one side would
always win. But we have seen that, in fact, the full formula is too
complicated for humans to understand. This ensures that the strongest side
never presents its best argument, opening the door to occasional outcomes
in which the weaker side prevails by presenting the stronger of two
inherently imperfect arguments.
In fact, the situation is worse than that. Given that advocates often
know very little about their judges,115 the safest course will often be to
assume universality116 and write for an average audience. Even then,
however, advocates need to worry that their own views might be eccentric.
This explains why practicing lawyers endlessly rehearse their arguments
to colleagues, trying out new variants to find the most attractive one.117
Grand Illusion
One of legal realism’s biggest failings is that it says almost nothing
about how lawyers actually practice. Watch oral argument in any
courtroom and you will see advocates talk endlessly about “The Law” as
if it existed outside themselves. This resembles nothing so much as the old
claim that mathematics is never “created” but only “discovered.”118
Legal realists, of course, dismiss this as a smokescreen to hide
judges’ arbitrariness from a credulous public. But in that case, why do
lawyers do the same thing in private when there is no public to play to?
The better answer is that universality only exists as a statistical quantity—
and a fairly weak one at that. On the one hand, every lawyer shares a small
piece of it, enough to convince her that her own instincts are far better than
1930, however, Wolfgang Pauli invented a new particle (the “neutrino”) as what he called a “desperate
way out” of several deep problems in nuclear theory. The particle was duly discovered. Fifty years
later, theorists routinely postulated large and even infinite numbers of particles. ABRAHAM PAIS,
INWARD BOUND: OF MATTER AND FORCES IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD 315 (1986).
115. Most of us are reminded of this fact every December 25, when we learn anew how hard it
is to anticipate even close relations’ taste in books and clothing. The average advocate has far fewer
clues to individual judges’ tastes.
116. There is a direct parallel in publishing, where many authors and editors look for stories that
they themselves would enjoy without considering how other humans might differ. Stephen M. Maurer,
From Bards to Search Engines: Finding what Readers Want from Ancient Times to the World Wide
Web, 66 S.C. L. REV. 495, 503–04 (2014).
117. The same principle is used in Hollywood focus groups. Id. at 526.
118. MARIO LIVIO, IS GOD A MATHEMATICIAN? passim (2009).
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the average layperson’s. On the other hand, she also knows that her
estimates are often wrong. The only way to be sure is to ask other lawyers.
Law feels external because, in the deepest sense, it is.
V. TOWARD A TYPE 1 THEORY OF LAW: INSTITUTIONS
Superficially, Child’s 60% universality is only 10% better than a
simple coin toss. Whether this matters depends on institutions. For
example, 60% agreement among voters would be a landslide in national
politics.119 The question for law is how court systems amplify and
occasionally garble the signal.
A. What Does “Rule of Law” Require?
We begin by recalling what democratic theory seeks to accomplish.
Congress cannot anticipate every contingency, and only returns to
particular topics every few decades. In the meantime, rule of law requires
that judges fill the inevitable gaps in ways that do not depart too quickly
from what Congress wants. An ideal common law system should therefore
be something between a dumb flywheel and a smart-ish autopilot that
anticipates how Congress is likely to vote next time.120
B. Is Formalism Stable?
We have argued that lawyers’ Type 1 intuitions provide a coherent
foundation for quasi-formalist rulemaking. But judges have other options:
if they want to, they can equally indulge cronyism or personal politics.
Which behavior actually prevails depends on history: as economists say,
many equilibria are possible.121 Still, we would like to confirm that
formalist systems really are equilibria, i.e. that once established they can
persist indefinitely. Empirically, there is good anecdotal122 and
statistical123 evidence that real judges respect precedent. But it would be
better to have some deeper understanding of why this might be.
119. By the standards of presidential politics, 60% is nothing short of a landslide. Largest
Landslide Victories in US Presidential Election History, WORLD ATLAS, https://www.worldatlas.
com/articles/largest-landslide-victories-in-us-presidential-election-history.html [https://perma.cc/
R2A5-RXDN] (60% of U.S. Presidential elections have been decided by less than 10%.).
120. Cf. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 217 (arguing that discretion need not
be “political,” but could equally “just be random”).
121. For a very short survey of multiple equilibrium ideas in economics, see, e.g., Multiple
Equilibria, ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-scien
ces-magazines/multiple-equilibria [https://perma.cc/87AF-LG2B].
122. See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 4, at 42–44, 49–50 (reporting that many
judges decide cases according to formalist ideals).
123. For one of the rare recent efforts to probe judicial behavior at the trial court level, see Daniel
L. Chen, Jens Frankenreiter & Susan Yeh, Judicial Compliance in District Courts 5 (Toulouse Sch.
of Econ., Working Paper No. 16-715, 2016), https://www.tse-fr.eu/publications/judicial-compliance-
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Consider, then, a toy model124 where judges seek working lawyers’
endorsements for psychic reasons like prestige or material ones like
promotion.125 How should judges behave? A full analysis would start from
the formal economics of repeat games.126 Assume however, that lawyers
earn their living by negotiating and occasionally litigating business
transactions.127 Since risk makes deals less attractive, the best way to
increase transactions (and lawyer income) is to make them less risky.
Formalism does this by divorcing judges’ rulings from random cronyism
and politics. Strangely, even cronies should dislike cronyism, since the
prospect of neutral enforcement makes people more willing to sign
contracts with them in the first place.128
Cheating
So far we have assumed that judges who depart from formalist logic
are immediately detected. But since universality is stochastic, lawyers
district-courts [https://perma.cc/R67X-4PH8] (finding statistical evidence that US federal lower court
cases filed before and resolved after higher court decisions are 29–37% more likely to rule in the same
direction as the appellate court).
124. Social and natural scientists often use deliberately simplistic models to explain mechanisms
concisely and point the way toward more complete accounts. See, e.g., Toy Model, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toy_model [https://perma.cc/P936-C6Z9].
125. Professors Epstein, Landes and Posner argue that judicial utility is based on multiple factors
that are plausibly consistent with the model presented here. These include internal satisfaction from
“feeling that one has done a good job,” and the external satisfactions from “reputation, prestige, power,
influence, and celebrity” such as the possibility of promotion to a higher court or moving to a high
paid private sector job. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR
OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 48 (2013).
126. Economists have modeled the situation in one of two ways. First, they consider trust games
in which Alice helps Bob because she thinks he will return the favor. If Bob makes a reciprocal
calculation, the assumptions become self-reinforcing even though neither is enforceable. The trust
game dynamic is particularly visible when attorneys hire local co-counsel to avoid being
“hometowned” in unfamiliar courthouses. Having local counsel present turns what would otherwise
be a dangerous one-time transaction into one more installment in the community’s repeat interactions.
The second set of theories assumes that each actor inherently possesses a fixed amount of
trustworthiness which, however, cannot be measured directly. Parties then update their estimates each
time a request is or is not honored. For a mathematically rigorous account of repeat game literature,
see Luís M. B. Cabral, The Economics of Trust and Reputation: A Primer (June 5, 2005) (preliminary
draft) (on file with N.Y.U.), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/reputation/Reputation_June05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DJ6J-HETJ].
127. The argument assumes that the same lawyers simultaneously write contracts and appear
before judges. While this is seldom true for individual lawyers, law firms routinely do both.
128. Of course, our model is only a toy. Many real lawyers make a living by representing nonbusiness clients like tort victims. Furthermore, court systems are embedded in larger institutions. This
suggests that judges could decide that it is better to write decisions that pander to the ideology of
political parties that might one day promote them. Finally, one can imagine variant models where the
cronies are lawyers rather than litigants. Since clients are risk averse, lawyers trying to keep clients
happy will normally lose more from downside losses than they gain from upside wins. This suggests
that judges are most likely to please counsel on average by adopting split-the-difference strategies that
protect both sides against deep losses.
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cannot be sure whether judges who disagree with them are corrupt or just
mistaken. This forces them to wait for enough large or repeated departures
to confirm dishonesty. But of course, judges also know this, which means
that cheaters can postpone discovery by picking and choosing how often
they cheat.129
C. Amplification
Modern versions of universality need institutions to elevate weak
signals into system-wide rules. But this is not enough: they should also
avoid mistakes. Assume, following Child, that a single judge will arrive at
the correct (universal) rule 60% of the time. Replacing her with a panel
improves matters, but only slowly: a three judge panel will have the right
answer 65% of the time, a five judge panel 73% percent, and so on.130
The question is still more complicated when we recall that courts
influence each other. Economists typically analyze this kind of dynamic
through “social influence” networks where each member starts with some
idiosyncratic belief and then modifies it each time she learns what others
think.131 For example, Alice might influence Bob, who influences Carl,
who then closes the circle by influencing Alice. But there could also be a
second path in which Alice talks to Carl, who gives his opinion directly
back to Alice. This choice of paths necessarily injects a measure of
randomness into the calculation. Despite this, most social influence
models seem to be well-behaved in the sense that each judge eventually
converges on a stable, long-run opinion.132
Real life is bound to be messier. Probably the most obvious
complication is that courts only write opinions when plaintiffs decide that
bringing suit will be cost-effective. This suggests that bad theories can
linger for years waiting for a plaintiff that is either sufficiently rich or
sufficiently desperate to attempt a revival.133 We should also expect
129. Casual observers often accuse judges of ignoring the law. But judges who study an issue
for weeks necessarily change their neural networks in the process. This suggests that casual observers
will always see things somewhat differently and that judges are more sincere than they seem.
130. The estimate assumes that each judge decides independently, i.e. that no judge consults any
other judge before deciding. To the extent that discussion makes judges more receptive to new
patterns, the 65% figure should be seen as a lower bound.
131. MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS 228–35 (2008). The belief is
conventionally expressed as the probability that some particular event will happen, in our case that a
particular proposition of law becomes the majority rule.
132. Economists have also found solutions where members’ opinions can oscillate indefinitely.
However, this only happens where every path that leads from Alice back to herself is the same length.
This is unlikely for real court systems, where the order in which different circuits consider cases is
usually random. See id. at 230–33.
133. One of the most spectacular examples derives from antitrust law, where litigants have
essentially stopped writing contracts authorized by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), even though the Court has twice declined to overrule it.
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strategic behaviors. These include attempts to change the law through
forum shopping and sustained campaigns in which government and
advocacy groups continue bringing cases until the law finally changes.134
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The age-old debate between the legal realists and formalists was
never about policy. Indeed, the realists hardly ever denied that formalism
and rule of law were desirable—only that they were possible. By
comparison, recognizing the centrality of Type 1 processes implies
important policy choices. On the one hand, policymakers must now decide
which mode works best for each and every legal issue. On the other hand,
Type 1 processes are largely unconscious. What can policymakers
reasonably do to control bias?
A. Division of Labor: Choosing Between Type 1 and Type 2 Reasoning
Lawyers value Type 2 proofs for their transparency: being articulable
means that anyone can check their logic. At the same time, Type 2 rules
are inflexible and for that reason prone to absurdities.135 When this
happens, judges and advocates can either try to construct a new Type 2
system—as the law-and-economics movement advocates for antitrust136—
or ask whether a Type 1 solution might work better after all.
Sometimes the answer is clear. For example, psychologists have
shown that Type 2 judgments based on formal statistical analyses work
better than Type 1 judgments for any problem that can be reduced to an
actuarial table.137 This suggests that the much-maligned Federal
See, e.g., A.J. WEINSCHEL, ANTITRUST-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK (2000) (advising
practitioners that it is not “prudent” to rely on the case).
134. Law students often wonder why the middle third of their antitrust textbooks consists entirely
of cases decided in the 1940s. The reason is the Roosevelt Administration, which saw the “little
Depression” of 1937 as evidence that monopolies were strangling the economy. F.D.R. reacted by
expanding the Justice Department’s Anti-Trust Division from a few dozen lawyers to nearly three
hundred. The statute’s reach expanded dramatically over the next decade. DAVID M. KENNEDY,
FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945, 359 (1999).
135. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 240–41 (“[A] legal rule that is too
specific, may for that reason lack adaptability.”).
136. Antitrust law provides the closest analog to policy-based decision-making in modern law.
Once the U.S. Supreme Court gave up on per se rules in the late 1930s, every dispute revisited policy
more or less from scratch. This must have been tempting since microeconomic theory is both
conceptually clear and predictive. Despite this, the results have been widely criticized. See, e.g.,
Holman Jenkins, Jr., How Justice Went Wrong on AT&T: Comcast-Type Decrees May Be a Kludge, but
They Help to Dissipate the Political Heat, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/howjustice-went-wrong-on-at-t-1513125457 (Antitrust “pretends to be . . . an objective, clinical analysis of
competitive conditions” but this only hides “a predisposition to meddle for bureaucratic or political
reasons.”).
137. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 2, at 234–44.
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Sentencing Guidelines, for example, might be the best choice after all. On
the other hand, similarly well-defined problems are rare in law. For closer
cases, at least, the psychology evidence suggests that judges should lean
toward Type 1 solutions when problems are sufficiently regular to be
predictable and common to allow prolonged practice.138
When Type 1 methods are desirable, the best way to implement them
will be to adopt open-ended inquiries on the pattern of the “reasonable
man” standard139 in tort law or the various “balancing tests” beloved by
constitutional lawyers.140 The good news, as we have argued, is that
universality will often make these standards more determinate than they
seem.
Textualism vs. Intentionality
This Article has so far focused on the global choice between Type 1
and Type 2 rules. But Type 1 thought is itself subdivided between aesthetic
judgments and pattern recognition. This neatly overlaps the traditional
division between “intentionalists,” who focus on what the original drafters
meant, and “textualists” who privilege how ordinary readers understand
documents on average.141 It is reasonable to think that readers’ facilities
for pattern recognition can be encouraged by, for example, doctrines that
stress historic intent over the reader’s own subjective reactions to text. But
in that case, which choice should the legal system make? We have
emphasized that universality depends partly on aesthetics and partly on
pattern recognition, and these will often pull in opposite directions. To the
extent that we value determinacy, we should choose whichever form of
universality proves strongest.
B. Deciding Close Cases
Legal scholars have long known that establishing a coherent “middle
ground” for interpreting precedent does not guarantee determinate
rulemaking. Instead, there will always be “hard cases” where the better

138. See id. at 251.
139. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(criticizing “the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”).
140. As Justice Scalia complained, most balancing rules are at least formally indeterminate,
telling judges to compare “incommensurable,” “unweighted,” and “unranked factors” without any
“principled metric for deciding” which cases fall within the rule. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and
the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 754–55 (2017).
141. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and
the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent,
91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).
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interpretation is unclear.142 The modern understanding of universality
suggests that this can happen for two reasons:
Reason 1. Universality only exists statistically, implying that some
well-informed individuals will normally dissent. Even when most judges
see one view as clearly superior, a few judges may see the choice as
indeterminate. Furthermore, the dissenters could well be different for
every issue.
Reason 2. Child presented his subjects with pairs in which Ivy
League experts overwhelmingly preferred one image to the other. But
suppose he had instead selected images where this was untrue? Logically,
we would expect “close cases” where experts disagree to be universal as
well.
The problem, of course, is that judges who encounter close cases
cannot be sure whether they are experiencing “Reason 1” or “Reason 2.”
From this standpoint, it is probably better for each judge to give her best
estimate for the correct outcome even in close cases, so that universality
emerges for Reason 1 cases in the usual way. This still leaves the question
of what to do about Reason 2 cases. Here, some individual human—
preferably the appellate courts—will have to decide. At the same time,
democratic theory suggests that Reason 1 cases should be decided through
universality. This means that appellate judges should normally defer to the
lower courts once a clear majority emerges.
C. Guarding Against Prejudice
The problem with Type 1 judgments is that they are unconscious.
This means that we can never be sure when prejudice enters in. Here,
universality is a partial corrective since purely personal biases will often
cancel each other on average. The larger question is what to do when the
prejudices are themselves universal. For example, psychologists have
shown that all humans prefer some faces to others.143 This makes it
reasonable to worry that judges might sometimes rule for the prettiest
litigant. Here, the most obvious response is to identify and correct biases
using explicitly Type 2 statistical reasoning. The deeper problem is that
our logical selves may not understand the patterns that machines find in
our Type 1 reasoning. The question will then become whether we trust our
machines enough to take corrective action on faith.
142. See Dworkin, supra note 10, at 160–61 (“The distinction between hard and easy cases at
law is perhaps just the distinction between cases that do and do not” permit “a unique interpretation”
on the basis of fit.); POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 287 (“[M]aybe reason cannot
decide the hard cases.”).
143. Renoult, supra note 72, at 283 (summarizing evidence that humans universally prefer
average, symmetric, and sexually dimorphic faces).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that legal reasoning cannot be analyzed in
exclusively logical, Type 2 terms. Instead, Type 1 intuitions play a crucial
role in deciding how law evolves. Acknowledging this reality will force
policymakers to confront significant new issues, most obviously whether
legal doctrine should encourage Type 1 or Type 2 processes in specific
cases.
The surprise is universality, i.e. the tendency of lawyers to reach
similar judgments no matter what culture they were born into. This
provides a natural explanation for the common perception that judges feel
significantly constrained by a middle ground that is neither “formalist” nor
“legalist.” The account is also normatively attractive, since universality
seems to depend on shared truths that most practicing lawyers will
eventually come to. Apparently, law is more than identity politics after all.
The Victorian vision that aesthetic insights will lead society to the
mind of God are gone forever. But we can still hope to build common law
systems that are impartial, predictable, and stable against unconscious
bias. Compared to the claims of its predecessors, this new formalism is
modest, imperfect, and stochastic. No matter. It will do.

